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A Government Distracted 
If 1996 was a horror year for the Coalition minority government, the succeeding year was not 
much better. The State Government reeled from one crisis to another and the political atmosphere 
remained highly-charged. Yet, behind the scenes ministers and departments started to get down to 
business and began to record some achievements. In part this was possible because an apparently 
knife-edge majority proved no great impediment to governing. The one comfort for the Coalition 
government was the almost unshakeable backing of the Independent Liz Cunningham, who could 
be relied on to provide support in Parliament on tests of confidence in the minority government 
and on most of their significant legislative proposals. Cunningham was regularly briefed on the 
government's legislative initiatives and on any other relevant political information the government 
chose to give her — so much so that she was sometimes referred to as a closet National or the 45th 
Coalition member. By late 1997, despite remaining beleaguered by a succession of crises, the 
government was approaching its second anniversary in office and began to promote its 
achievements and contemplate the prospects of re-election for the first time since re-taking the 
Treasury benches. 
Unemployment levels remained stubbornly high within the state, rising to 9.8 per cent by 
September and remaining close to ten per cent for the rest of the year. Youth unemployment was 
around thirty per cent with nearly 20,000 teenagers registered as unemployed. Queensland's 
unemployment rates were well above the national average and the second worst mainland state 
behind South Australia. Despite the gloomy news on the jobs front, the government was able to 
point to some jobs growth (but far less than the 50,000 the Treasurer had promised in the previous 
budget), and to the fact that some major companies had established in Queensland — some even 
locating their head offices within the state. Perhaps the most important achievement was the 
announcement that the Boeing Corporation would establish its Australian headquarters in 
Queensland, bringing about 1,000 new jobs to the state. Moves by other firms to Brisbane were 
estimated to add a further 1,600 jobs (Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 8 October 1997, pp. 
3735-45) . 
Opinion polls indicated the government and the opposition were neck and neck. By mid-year 
the polls repeatedly showed the primary votes of both sides of politics hovering around forty to 
forty-one per cent. The Premier, Rob Borbidge, and the Opposition leader, Peter Beattie, both 
expressed the view that the forthcoming election would be tight and that neither side had shown the 
capacity to build a substantial lead over the other. Toward the end of 1997 the ALP appeared in 
front in some opinion polls on a two-party preferred basis (recording a fifty-three per cent to forty-
seven per cent lead in a poll published in the Courier-Mail on 11 October). But both sides had 
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cause for concern; the drubbing handed out to the South Australian Liberals had sent a powerful 
message to incumbent governments; and especially in the bush, Pauline Hanson's One Nation 
Party added another dimension of uncertainty. Labor also had to wrestle with the political fall-out 
of Wik and at the state level the Party was seen to be opposing the Howard Government's 
amendments to the Native Title Act in the Senate. 
In July 1997 the government announced the appointment of a new State Governor, Major-
General Peter Arnison, to replace Leneen Forde. Arnison had retired from the army in 1996 after a 
"long and distinguished" career. He had then turned to running a successful rubber factory with 
forty employees in Brisbane. On accepting the appointment Arnison declared that he wanted to 
promote business and be a governor "for all Queenslanders". 
The state was saddened when the former premier Wayne Goss was rushed to hospital on 21 
September suffering from a brain tumour. The news was a particular shock because he had always 
maintained a keen commitment to personal fitness during his political life and was only forty-six 
years old at the time of his illness. Political leaders from all sides including the Prime Minister, 
Premier, and Opposition leader extended their well wishes for a speedy recovery and support to the 
Goss family The three-hour operation was successful and doctors told the family that although the 
tumour was malignant no further treatment was required. Shortly before this incident, Goss had 
indicated he would resign his seat in State Parliament (Logan) at the next election and would 
instead contest pre-selection for the Federal seat of Oxley. The ALP delayed the pre-selection 
process for Oxley until 1998 to allow the former premier time to recover and consider his future. 
After recuperating Goss returned to work in November and resumed his position in the Assembly 
(he had been paired for the duration of his illness). But shortly after his return he announced he 
would not contest Oxley but instead take up other pursuits. His decision threw the ALP's Oxley 
pre-selection wide open and a fierce battle between contenders commenced. 
Cheryl Kernot stunned both national and state politics when she announced her defection from 
the Australian Democrats and that she intended joining the ALP in Queensland. She resigned her 
Senate seat and announced her intention to stand for the ALP in the Federal seat of Dickson to the 
west of Brisbane. On this occasion the Queensland Government did not indicate it would try to 
circumvent the Constitution (as Borbidge had earlier indicated he might should the former ALP 
senator Mal Colston resign) and appointed Andrew Bartlett who was nominated by the Democrats 
as the replacement State Senator. Kernot's defection was generally regarded as a much needed 
fillip for the local ALP — especially as an early federal election seemed more certain. But, despite 
the Democrats remaining comparatively quiet over the defection, her decision was greeted with 
outright hostility by the Coalition who proceeded to launch a series of personal and occasionally 
scurrilous attacks on the former leader. 
Growing Criticism of the Connolly -Ryan Inquiry into the CJC 
In 1996 the Borbidge Government announced that it intended to conduct a formal investigation into 
the Criminal Justice Commission. At the time the Premier Rob Borbidge informed Cabinet he 
wanted a "short, sharp inquiry" and that three months was a "reasonable" time-frame. The 
appointment of two retired judges — Peter Connolly and Kevin Ryan — as commissioners became 
controversial principally because Connolly was an ex-Liberal politician who was considered close 
to the government. Given that the commissioners began their inquiry on 7 October, the premier's 
deadline was reached in early January 1997. But by the middle of 1997 after nine months of 
investigation, the Connolly-Ryan inquiry showed no signs of bringing its work to an end despite 
the fact that its main political purpose had long since been achieved — the discrediting and closing 
down of the rival Carruthers inquiry called by the CJC to investigate deals between the Police 
Union and the Coalition when in opposition and the Labor Government and the Sporting Shooters 
group (see Political Chronicles AJPH 42, 3 (1996), pp. 424-25 and 43, 3 (1997), pp. 400-01). 
By June-July 1997 there was growing unease and criticism of the Connolly-Ryan inquiry within 
many circles even among the Coalition side of politics. There was a growing realisation that the 




inquiry had become discredited, enjoyed no broad political or community support, and was not 
widely regarded as independent. The proceedings of the inquiry suggested that instead of 
undertaking a systematic review of the CJC there was more interest in muck-raking. Criticism also 
focused on the mounting costs. When establishing the Connolly-Ryan inquiry, Attorney-General 
Denver Beanland admitted it would not "come cheap". By mid-year the Opposition was strident in 
its criticism of the politically-inspired inquiry which they reckoned was costing $50,000 a day, had 
been given no time limit, no budget limit, and very broad terms of reference. Labor dubbed the 
inquiry a "multi-million dollar waste of money". Media reports also referred to the inquiry as a 
"gravy train" for lawyers, and of the government writing 'blank cheques' to cover the expected $12 
million in associated costs. 
Peter Connolly brought further controversy to the inquiry by making comments to the media 
which left the impression that he was biased. Connolly also made personal and insulting remarks 
about Ken Carruthers and his decision to quit as head of the inquiry into the Police Memorandum 
of Understanding. Such comments strengthened the perception that the Connolly-Ryan inquiry was 
a political fix. 
Carruthers and CJC Initiate Court Challenges to Connolly -Ryan Inquiry 
In June 1997 both Ken Carruthers and the CJC filed writs with the Supreme Court accusing the 
commissioners of bias and attempting to limit the scope of the Connolly-Ryan inquiry. Carruthers 
lodged his case on 4 June to prevent Connolly-Ryan investigating his own aborted inquiry into the 
memorandum of understanding and the CJC joined Carruthers in a submission on 12 June. The 
case came before the Supreme Court and was heard by Judge James Thomas. The hearing began on 
21 July and lasted fifteen days. At the hearings Professor Ross Homel, one of the CJC 
commissioners, informed the Supreme Court that Peter Connolly had told him that a review of the 
Fitzgerald reforms was now possible because "our side is back in power". Judge Thomas also 
probed the extent to which the commissioners had attempted to demonstrate their fairness and 
impartiality. 
On 5 August Judge Thomas upheld the complaints of Carruthers and the CJC, ruling that the 
commissioners were disqualified from conducting further proceedings and in effect closed down 
the inquiry. Thomas concluded that Connolly had acted toward Carruthers in a manner that was 
"oppressive and unfair" and that his demands had been "outrageous". The head of an inquiry 
should be seen to be an independent commissioner "not an executioner" said the judge. "There is a 
strong case of ostensible bias on the part of Mr Connolly ... [including] a perception of his 
continuing favour for one side of politics." In disqualifying Connolly, Thomas also found that 
Kevin Ryan did not have the power and authority to conduct the inquiry alone and "his extensive 
association with Mr Connolly makes a reasonable apprehension of unfairness and lack of 
impartiality in the result inevitable under the circumstances". Thomas concluded that Connolly and 
Ryan were outside their terms of reference when they began investigating the Carruthers Inquiry 
while it was in existence. 
The judge's ruling was a body blow to the government and especially the Attorney-General. 
The Sydney Morning Herald described the court's decision as confirmation that "the inquiry was a 
politically motivated if clumsy attempt to nobble the CJC" (7 August 1997). The Australian argued 
that Judge Thomas' ruling "implicitly accused the Premier and the Attorney-General of ... 
establishing a political witch-hunt" (6 August 1997). 
Following the termination of the inquiry the political debate returned to the costs involved. 
Various figures were given on the total costs of the two inquiries — Labor claimed that the 
Carruthers and Connolly-Ryan inquiries had cost $14.5 million The Courier-Mail estimated that 
the Connolly-Ryan inquiry has cost $11 million and that together the two inquiries had 
"squandered" over $14 million or "the equivalent of someone standing in the Queen Street Mall 
and tearing up $27,000 every day" for over eighteen months (6 August 1997, p. 15). Later the 
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Attorney-General claimed that the direct costs came to just over $7 million but this figure may not 
have included other costs associated with the inquiry. 
The Passing of No -Confidence in Attorney -General Denver Beanland 
The government chose not to appeal against Judge Thomas' ruling, but rather to announce that they 
still intended to go ahead with revisions to the Criminal Justice Act and a restructuring of the CJC. 
They also announced their intention of establishing a Crime Commission to take over some of the 
crime responsibilities attached to the CJC — some of which the CJC was by its own admission not 
actively pursuing such as organised paedophilia. 
At the same time there was widespread condemnation of the highly political manner in which 
Denver Beanland had conducted himself as Attorney-General — supposedly the first law officer of 
the Crown. The Labor Opposition demanded Beanland resign or be sacked over the debkle — and 
they were not alone in this view. The Courier-Mail carried an editorial on 26 July stating 
"Beanland has failed in his duty to put justice first". The week following the Thomas judgement 
the paper again demanded Beanland's resignation, adding that the "biased CJC probe means that 
the A-G must go" (6 August 1997). They kept up the campaign — and even in late August were 
still demanding Beanland should go or be sacked (30 August 1997). 
But the Premier decided to tough it out despite the political costs. At the first news conference 
called after Thomas' ruling Borbidge stood symbolically by his minister who looked fraught and 
dejected (there were some media rumours that Beanland had privately offered the Premier his 
resignation but it had not been accepted — the Premier denied this). The storm did not dissipate 
and with Parliament about to resume the Opposition announced that it would move a no-confidence 
motion in the government and in the Attorney-General. On 19 August Liz Cunningham voted with 
the Coalition to defeat the motion of no-confidence in the government (forty-five to forty-four after 
the Speaker's deciding vote). But on the following day she voted with the Opposition to pass a no-
confidence motion in Denver Beanland as Attorney-General (with 45 to 43 in favour). Yet, after 
this vote Beanland refused publicly to resign and the Premier refused to sack him They 
highlighted comments made by Cunningham outside the House that the motion was tougher than 
she would have preferred and that she did not intend Beanland to resign when she declared her lack 
of confidence in him as the first law officer. 
The Premier sought legal advice which provided him with a defence based on a selective 
interpretation of the state's constitution and on the issue of whether any previous conventions had 
already been established regarding ministerial resignations. The defence strained credibility in 
terms of accepted notions of accountable behaviour under the Westminster system of responsible 
government. In a Ministerial Statement to Parliament, the Premier stated: 
where a government still enjoys the confidence of the House, the selection of the ministry is a 
matter for the prime minister or the premier ... there is no clear convention that would require 
the premier to dismiss an individual minister who has been made the subject of a motion of no 
confidence in the House ... The Crown Solicitor advised that the position adopted by the 
individual minister is not absolutely clear ... The Crown Solicitor advised: ... 'on the material 
which I have uncovered to date, there does not appear to be any clear obligation on a minister 
(in respect of whom a no confidence motion has been passed) to, as a matter of constitutional 
convention, offer his resignation to the premier' ... The Crown Solicitor advised: 'provided the 
government of the day enjoys the confidence of the House, the governor may only appoint or 
dismiss a minister of the Crown on the advice of the premier ... certainly there appears to be no 
convention requiring the governor to dismiss a minister who declines to resign following a vote 
of no confidence ... I do not see that his Excellency the Governor as a matter of constitutional 
convention would now have any role to play in relation to the tenure of the relevant minister' ... 
The House continues to have confidence in this government. 
Although the Premier stated that there was no clear convention for him (or the Governor) to 
dismiss a minister in such circumstances this was simply an acknowledgement that the matter of a 
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minister not resigning after a successful vote of no-confidence had never occurred before in the 
state's history. In effect the new constitutional interpretation advanced by the Premier argued that 
ministers were not individual ministers accountable to Parliament but only accountable to him as 
Premier. Accordingly all ministers were merely "ministers assisting the Premier" who survived at 
the grace of the Premier of the day. But even this reasoning seemed contradicted by recent 
evidence — as in the case in 1987 when the then Governor Sir Walter Campbell refused Premier 
Bjelke-Petersen's request to sack a group of his ministers. The Premier's actions and arguments 
served to weaken further parliamentary accountability in Queensland. 
Beanland hung on as a minister only because the Premier chose to stand solidly behind him. 
The Premier's actions could be explained as loyalty to a colleague, or as an acknowledgement that 
the two of them were in this together. Alternatively, there was a feeling in some quarters that the 
Premier (and Police Minister Russell Cooper) were considerably indebted to Beanland for his 
previous actions as Attorney-General. As it transpired the lawyers responsible for bringing the final 
recommendations forward from the Carruthers inquiry (Robert Gotterson QC and Brendan Butler 
QC) had not recommended charges be brought against either Borbidge or Cooper. This eventual 
"exoneration" meant that the legal costs of their defence were able to be paid from the public 
purse. 
Beanland came in for further attack from the head of the CJC, Frank Clair, who was critical of 
the Attorney-General's role in the CJC review process and of his announced intention to oversee 
"reforms" to the CJC Act. Clair considered it "inappropriate"' for Beanland to be involved in this 
review and asserted "he's shown himself to be really the last person who ought to be making any 
assessment of the CJC's role and performance" (ABC Transcript 22 August 1997). 
The war between the government and the CJC continued. Despite Clair's reservations, the 
government pushed ahead with the review and introduced both a new Crime Commission and 
amendments to the Criminal Justice Act in late 1997. The Crime Commission was responsible to a 
minister (rather than directly to Parliament as was the CJC) and was charged with solving major 
crime including organised paedophilia. The changes to the CJ Act provided for the appointment of 
a Criminal Justice Commissioner to oversee and investigate the accountability of the CJC. The 
Parliamentary Commissioner would report to the Parliamentary Criminal Justice Committee. 
Queensland's Reaction to the High Court's Decision on State Franchise Taxes 
On 5 August 1997 the High Court handed down a decision ruling that "state franchise taxes" were 
essentially excise taxes and therefore unconstitutional. The case had been brought before the Court 
by opponents of the NSW tobacco franchise fee (which was levied on turnover). The decision also 
affected state petrol, alcohol and tobacco turnover taxes which were similarly classified as excise 
taxes and declared illegal. The Court's decision applied to all state governments. In the days after 
the ruling many industry operators began suggesting that if the taxes were unconstitutional they 
were due compensation. For the states the consequences were dire, with the Court's judgement 
appearing to deal a blow to state differentiation and their capacity to impose variability of tax 
rates. Not surprisingly, state premiers and treasurers were up in arms over the decision — despite 
having years of warning (and some contingency planning) that eventually such a decision could go 
against them. The Commonwealth offered to collect equivalent new national tax surcharges to 
make up the losses for the states, but the Commonwealth could only impose uniform rates across 
the entire nation and the Federal Treasurer Peter Costello insisted that they did not want to see an 
increase in prices for these goods. The Commonwealth was prepared to impose the highest state 
rate on wholesalers but would not permit states to profit from "windfall" revenues. States would 
have to hand back the taxes at the state level so as not to increase the existing rates of taxation. 
This raised many administrative problems. 
In Queensland the problems were doubly complex because the state did not levy petrol taxes, 
and rates of taxation differed from other states on tobacco and alcohol. The prospect of uniform 
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national taxes was not welcomed by the State Government, which like its many predecessors had 
given explicit commitments to maintain the state's status as a low taxing regime. The alternative 
for Queensland was to entertain the prospect of expensive methods of reimbursement to 
wholesalers and retailers so that prices would not rise. While the arrangements were still settling 
down, Commonwealth and State Treasury made hurried plans to implement a feasible repayment 
scheme for fuel suppliers. On 13 October the Prime Minister and Premier in a joint announcement 
confirmed that both governments had agreed on a fuel subsidy scheme to reimburse fuel suppliers 
and bulk end users. There were, however, allegations from the Opposition and some industry 
groups that the administrative arrangements were cumbersome and costly. The Opposition also 
accused the State Government of forfeiting up to $80 million per year on the deal it negotiated with 
the Federal Government over fuel tax rebates (because the state only received funding on a per 
capita basis not according to actual fuel consumed). The long-term impact of the Court's decision 
was likely to expedite the introduction of a general goods and service tax (GST) across Australia. 
In October the Opposition leaked a confidential briefing paper on taxation reform that had been 
prepared collectively by the official steering group for the states and territories. The discussion 
paper canvassed proposals to introduce additional taxes and surcharges, in particular a value-added 
tax or goods and service tax which would be levied by the Federal Government but the states 
would gain a fixed share of the revenue. The Opposition claimed that this document represented a 
"secret tax agenda" promoted by Coalition governments at the Commonwealth and state levels. 
The Queensland Treasurer, Joan Sheldon, argued that Queensland officials had only participated on 
a "no commitment basis" but added that "we have to be able to increase the revenue base into the 
state for the services we provide". 
The Public Service "Hit List" 
In August a former director and long-time strategist of the National Party, Mike Evans, told a 
Conservative Club breakfast in Brisbane that while working in the Premier's Office he had 
personally screened public servants to uncover those who had links to the ALP or who might have 
been sympathetic to the former Labor Government. Evans told the audience that "I took the 
microscope, I looked at government departments and I came across all these cells of Labor Party 
supporters". He suggested that some departments were "laced very much with Labor Party 
operatives" and "they're leaking things to the media to make sure that a negative agenda is coming 
through". Following this admission, he then went on to ask the presidents of the Liberal and 
National parties (Bob Carroll and David Russell respectively) whether they had "made any 
decisions on what is to be done to try to stop that situation or remove those people?" (Australian, 
30 August 1997). 
Copies of the so-called "hit list" had been circulating for months and the matter had been 
referred to the CJC for investigation. The "Hit List" with 120 names recorded was organised on a 
department-by-department basis with the names of suspects identified along with idiosyncratic 
comments about known allegiances, political partners or spouses, and occasional comments on 
performance. The list appeared to be a working document intended to expose known or supposed 
Labor Party sympathisers. But as Labor was quick to point out it was neither accurate nor 
systematic. The Opposition leader described the admission by Evans as evidence that the 
government was politicising the public service and "trying to weed out people who were not pro 
the government". The Premier publicly denied any knowledge of the "hit list". 
In September during a hearing into the dismissal of Ms Jacki Byrne (the sacked director-general 
of the Family Services department), Arthur Muhl, a member of the Premier's transition to 
government committee admitted that a "hit list" was passed to the committee by Ms Wendy 
Armstrong. According to Muhl the "hit list" was circulated to the committee but was regarded as 
"dangerous and lacking in substance" (Australian, 12 September 1997). He confirmed that the 
original list was "much more scurrilous" than the one which had subsequently been circulated. He 
also asserted that Ms Armstrong would not disclose the identity of the author(s) of the document 
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and that he had passed his copy of the list on to Mike Evans who was then working in the 
Premier's Office. 
In response to the government's vendetta, Peter Beattie later clarified how an incoming Labor 
Government would behave, saying that Labor would not retain the services of the "Coalition's 
Dad's Army of recycled, former senior executives". In his statement Beattie ruled out a 
"bloodbath" and committed Labor to a professional career public service. But he acknowledged 
that only about "two or three" current directors-general would be likely to remain if Labor were 
elected. 
Bob Bottom, Rumours of Sexual Impropriety and Allegations of Paedophilia 
Amid the other controversies to dog the government throughout 1997, politicians on both sides 
found themselves enmeshed in sordid allegations of sexual impropriety, cover-ups, and turning a 
blind eye to organised paedophilia networks. The Courier-Mail began running a series of articles 
attempting to expose paedophilia, alleging that the corrupt former Police Commissioner Terry 
Lewis had kept "dirt files" on the sexual practices of well-known local identities. The interstate 
press also took an interest. The Sydney Morning Herald reported that "allegations of organised 
paedophilia networks and secret police 'dirt files' [were] mounting daily, the names of prominent 
Queenslanders — judges and senior politicians included — are being whispered in connection with 
all manner of smutty goings-on" (23 August 1997). 
Russell Grenning, a former associate of Main Roads Minister Russ Hinze and staffer with 
Police Minister Russell Cooper, was reported as having come under police investigation in 1983 in 
connection with receiving pornographic material, and that the investigation was dropped at the 
time because of "political reasons". Grenning was subsequently "outed "as a homosexual and in 
the process resigned from Cooper's staff. In a letter to the Opposition leader, Grenning wrote 
"should this matter degenerate into a slanging match about the private lives of politicians and their 
staff, there are more than a few on your side of the House — past and present — who would suffer 
unfairly as I have". 
In unrelated developments a series of allegations appeared over paedophile rackets existing in 
Queensland. The member for Whitsunday, Lorraine Bird, alleged that an organised paedophilia 
network was operating in Whitsunday island resorts. Police reports acknowledged that some such 
problem had emerged in the past but had been stamped out, and Bird provided little new evidence. 
From other sources the Queensland Children's Commission released a report on paedophilia which 
was tabled in Parliament in late August. The report on paedophilia was written and compiled by the 
head of the QCC, Norm Alford, and a consultant adviser Bob Bottom — the NSW author and 
crime crusader. According to Alford and Bottom's calculations Queensland had 300 hard core 
active paedophiles, many of whom had been protected by police. They claimed that paedophiles 
included "two or three judges, a former cabinet minister, former MPs from both sides of politics 
and senior police" (SMH 23 August 1997). 
After the CJC moved to investigate one of these matters, Bob Bottom went on radio to claim 
that the CJC had launched a "Watergate style raid on a policewoman at Southport seeking material 
on a particular political figure ... it wasn"t concerning paedophilia. It was over sexual habits". The 
policewoman in question was allegedly related to Terry Lewis. Rumours again circulated that in 
1984 a then serving National Party minister had taken a backbench colleague to Brett's Boys male 
brothel in Kelvin Grove. The former minister was no longer in Parliament but the alleged 
backbencher was supposedly a serving senior minister in the government. The ABC's 7.30 Report 
broadcast that "the alleged patronage of this male brothel in 1984 by a current senior member of 
the Coalition government is now at the centre of the corruption storm in Queensland ... promis[ing] 
to keep the stoush between the Queensland government and the CJC going for some considerable 
time yet" (ABC Transcript, 28 August 1997). The allegations of involvement by a senior member 
of the government were denied by the Premier who told Parliament "as leader of this government I 
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am unaware, totally unaware of the claims and whether those claims have any substance 
whatsoever. I have no knowledge of any such details or any member of this government being 
implicated in respect to the allegations being made" (Australian, 30-31 August 1997). 
The immediate loser to suffer from the scandal was Bob Bottom, whose services were quickly 
dispensed with the day after he made his outburst on radio. After his extraordinary intervention 
which only served to fan wider interest in the scandal, he was summarily dismissed by the Police 
Minister, Russell Cooper, who stated that he had decided on reflection not to "formalise his 
[Bottom's] appointment to advise on the investigation of organised crime and paedophilia" 
(Australian, 30-31 August 1997). 
The "Banana Bank": Privatisation of Suncorp -Metway 
The government pushed ahead with the privatisation of the amalgamated "state bank" of Suncorp-
Metway in September. The so-called "Banana Bank" (because of the elaborate government 
intervention undertaken to retain ownership in Queensland) included a sizeable portion of public 
ownership estimated to be around $610 million (from Suncorp and the QIDC). The state 
government opted to sell its holding to Queenslanders by issuing a public offer of "exchange 
instalment notes". These notes were partly paid on application ($3 each), with a further instalment 
one year later ($3.10 due in September 1998). On 1 November 1999 the notes held by investors 
would be exchanged for shares in the company. After a short but intensive publicity campaign the 
public offer was highly sought after and the notes over-subscribed. The Treasurer announced that 
"92%" of the float went to Queenslanders or existing Suncorp-Metway shareholders. The fact that 
Queenslanders received favoured treatment which allowed them to purchase larger portions of 
notes was locally popular but damaged the pro-business reputation of the government in southern 
markets. 
Other Distractions and Shenanigans 
The Speaker of Parliament, Neil Turner, announced that he supported the reintroduction of an 
Upper House in Queensland even though this was not the official policy of the National Party. He 
told journalists he would prefer that a referendum be held (as the Nationals had promised in the 
1995 state election campaign) so that the people could decide on the issue, but that the final 
decision to put such a question was not for him to decide personally. Turner linked the possible 
establishment of an upper chamber with the option of curtailing the CJC's role or powers. He 
believed "we should have an upper house elected by the people, answerable to the people, that 
monitors the Parliament in preference to an organisation like the Criminal Justice Commission 
which really in my opinion is just an ongoing type of Royal Commission that is virtually 
answerable to no one, voted in by no one, costing a tremendous amount of money" (ABC 
Transcript, 25 September 1997). He later clarified that the establishment of an Upper House would 
improve the monitoring and review of Parliament but not necessarily result in the abolition of the 
CJC. 
Of more immediate interest to the government was the decision to replace the government's jet 
aircraft (which had been a controversial political issue since the days of Bjelke-Petersen). The 
Premier announced in October that the government had decided to sell its fourteen-year old 
Westwing jet and purchase a Hawker 800 XP jet at a cost of $11 4 million (to be bought by the 
Queensland Treasury Corporation and leased by the government). The jets were used by 
government members as they toured the state or attended regional areas for official functions. But 
the official reason for the upgrade was that the jets were also used for organ transplant 
transportation — and so a new more reliable jet was needed to retrieve organs from distant donors. 
Finally, the Tourism Minister, Bruce Davidson, did not entirely cover himself in glory when he 
ventured to South Africa and returned promising a white Rhino park for northern Queensland. 
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Davidson was anxious to chalk some runs on the board in his portfolio and allowed some initial 
enthusiasm for the project to get the better of him It subsequently transpired that the minister was 
a little uncertain of the facts in relation to the necessary habitat and permits to export members of 
this endangered species. It seemed some of the species were too endangered to be re-located, that it 
would be unlikely the relevant African governments would grant export permits, and that the 
vegetation and climate in north Queensland may not be appropriate. When such difficulties 
emerged Davidson became the object of some criticism and ridicule. He was accused of wasting 
public funds, and of using public money to subsidise a tourism venture. When other gaffes were 
made on top of this Davidson was branded "the master of mistakes" but unlike others on the 
Coalition front bench he was able to weather such attacks and remain in the ministry. 
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